Article · Cybersecurity Intelligence
PHP2Shell attacks on Check Point gateways end in ESXi data wiping
DAAKYI Insights15 November 2026
Attackers used PHP2Shell and a root escalation flaw to take over Check Point gateways, then wiped VMware ESXi hosts. Here is what happened and what leaders should check.
What happened
Attackers have targeted vulnerable Check Point Security Gateway instances using PHP2Shell, the name given to two critical PHP flaws, CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, which allow unauthenticated remote code execution. According to the source report, the activity began on 30 October, first against Israeli organisations, and a single actor appears to have run the whole campaign from initial access to lateral movement. The attacker came in through the gateway's Mobile Access portal, then used a newly disclosed zero-day, CVE-2026-123039, to gain root privileges. From there they installed PHP webshells and a backdoor called TSGA, which includes a component named TSProxy that listens for commands hidden inside ordinary traffic. The timeline matters: PHP released emergency fixes on 21 October, Amazon Threat Intelligence reported exploitation attempts four days before that, and CISA added both flaws to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 26 October.
In the attacks on Israeli organisations, the actor moved from the gateway to VMware ESXi hosts, which it located with an open-source reconnaissance tool called gogo. It then ran a wiper named destroy_v6 that deletes data in a target directory recursively. The wiper first tries a zero fill to make recovery harder, and it also has a fast mode that skips the overwriting. A note left on the ESXi host contained political messages and rejected any ransom negotiation, which suggests the aim was damage and disruption rather than payment. Check Point tentatively linked the backdoor tooling to a malware framework previously seen in attacks on Ivanti appliances and associated by ESET with the cluster UNC5221, but the evidence does not support confident attribution, and the political messaging raises the possibility of a false flag. A second wave on 2 November reached companies in several countries and sectors. It did not include destructive activity, and what the attackers did afterwards is still unclear.
Why it matters for organisations in Africa, the Gulf and beyond
The first lesson is about intent. A wiper that refuses to negotiate removes the option of paying to get data back, so recovery depends entirely on what was prepared before the attack. The route matters as well. A security gateway is a trusted, privileged device at the edge of the network. When it falls, the attacker inherits a position from which the virtualisation layer, where many business workloads sit, is within reach. That is a different risk from a single compromised server.
The second lesson is that geography is not protection. The first wave was concentrated in one country, but the second spread across several countries and sectors, which is typical of opportunistic exploitation of internet-facing portals. Organisations in Africa, the Gulf and beyond often run the same gateway and virtualisation technologies as everyone else, so the exposure question is the same wherever they operate. DAAKYI's own regional threat analysis notes that in energy and utilities, intrusions translate into supply disruption and safety incidents, and that in healthcare, attacks on legacy clinical systems disrupt patient care. A destructive payload on shared infrastructure would deepen those consequences, not create new ones.
The third lesson concerns layering. This campaign chained a runtime flaw with a separate privilege escalation, and exploitation began before the PHP fixes were published. Patching one layer is therefore necessary but not enough. Leaders should treat the question as two parts: is the fix in place, and is there any sign that something happened before it was? The second part is the one most often skipped, and it depends on logs that attackers may already have tampered with.
What leaders should do now
The following steps follow the source guidance and the wider PHP2Shell response, and can be started this week.
- Install the November Jumbo Hotfix from Check Point on all Management Servers and Security Gateways, starting with those that have internet-facing Mobile Access portals. It addresses both PHP2Shell and the privilege escalation flaw used in these attacks.
- Update PHP runtimes on any other systems to the fixed releases: 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 or 8.2.35, and confirm the fix actually took effect.
- Check previously exposed gateways for compromise: session files containing upload_progress_pwn, unexpected CPconfigdaemon processes or binaries, and unexplained gaps in firewall logs.
- Treat any SSH activity from a gateway to an internal ESXi host as a sign of breach, and restrict which systems can reach hypervisor management at all.
- Verify that backups of virtualised workloads are held where a compromised gateway or hypervisor cannot reach them, and test a restore, since a wiper leaves no ransom route to recovery.
How DAAKYI can help
DAAKYI's network and infrastructure security engineering covers internal segmentation, secure remote access and infrastructure hardening, and our teams work with Check Point alongside Cisco, Fortinet and Zscaler. That includes reviewing how gateways, management planes and hypervisor hosts are separated, so that a compromise at the edge does not give a clear path to the systems behind it.
Where logs suggest earlier activity, DAAKYI's digital forensics and incident response team can help establish what was reached and what must be rotated or reported. Our managed vulnerability remediation service can help confirm that every affected runtime and gateway has been found and fixed, not only the ones on the asset list.
- network and infrastructure security
- digital forensics and incident response
- managed vulnerability remediation
Sources
- Check Point gateways hacked via PHP2Shell to deploy VMware ESXi wiper (BleepingComputer)
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