Solution · National Cybersecurity & Critical Infrastructure
A Partner for Essential Services.
The Challenge
Power, payments, telecoms and public services are now digital, and an attack on one can cascade across the economy.
The Outcome
- Sovereign security operations capability
- Protected essential services
- Skilled regulators and operators
Executive Summary
- 01National cybersecurity works when strategy, regulation, and daily operations are designed as one system rather than three separate programs.
- 02Critical information infrastructure protection starts with knowing which services matter most, then proving the controls around them actually work.
- 03A sovereign capability is measured by who can run it, tune it, and defend it without outside help.
The Challenge
Power, payments, telecoms and public services are now digital, and an attack on one can cascade across the economy.
National institutions must build capability, satisfy new law such as Act 1038 and keep sensitive data in jurisdiction at the same time.
The DAAKYI Approach
DAAKYI works across eight service areas, from national strategy and sector CERTs to SOC development, CII protection and capacity building.
Where ownership is the goal, Build–Operate–Transfer stands up a sovereign SOC and hands it over.
Delivered Through These DAAKYI Services
Relevant industries
- 01
National and sector strategy
- 02
CII identification and assurance
- 03
SOC development through Build–Operate–Transfer
- 04
Capacity building for regulators and operators
In Depth
How the Solution Comes Together
Start with Services, Not Systems
National programs begin by naming the services society cannot lose: electricity, payments, mobile connectivity, identity, and public records. Each service is traced to the systems, suppliers, and data flows behind it. That trace shows where one failure could spread into another sector. Regulators then use it to decide which operators and assets fall under critical information infrastructure designation, as Ghana's Act 1038 provides. The result is a ranked view of dependencies, not a flat asset list. Controls, audits, and exercises are then aimed at the points where impact would be greatest, which keeps limited national resources focused.
Detection Needs a National View
A single operator sees only its own network. A sector SOC or CERT sees patterns across many. When one bank, utility, or carrier reports a phishing wave or a new intrusion technique, others can block it before it lands. This depends on agreed reporting formats, trusted channels, and clear rules on what may be shared. Telemetry is mapped to adversary behavior, often using MITRE ATT&CK, so alerts from different operators describe the same activity in the same language. Coordination then moves from ad hoc phone calls to rehearsed procedures that regulators and operators have practiced together.
Ownership Decides Long‑Term Resilience
Security capability that depends permanently on outsiders is fragile. Sovereign operations therefore include a deliberate path to ownership: documented processes, trained local analysts, and tooling the institution can administer itself. Data handling matters as much as staffing. Logs, case files, and forensic evidence from critical systems often contain sensitive national information, so hosting location and access control are design decisions made early. Under the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843), personal data also carries registration and safeguard duties. A transfer is complete only when the institution can run, audit, and improve the capability on its own.
A nation is only as secure as the least‑prepared operator that its essential services quietly depend on.
Capability Matrix
What the Service Includes
National Programs
Strategies, frameworks, sector CERTs
SOC Development
Design, build and Build–Operate–Transfer
CII Protection
Identification, controls, assurance
Regulatory Compliance
Act 1038 and sector regulators
Incident Readiness
Playbooks, exercises, coordination
Capacity Building
Skills for regulators and operators
Data Sovereignty
In-jurisdiction hosting on DAAKYI Cloud
Operational Resilience
Continuity and recovery testing
Operating Model
Delivered from the GUIDE · SECURE · OPERATE Pillar
Pillar position
GUIDE · SECURE · OPERATE
Delivered across all three pillars
Engagement model
Build‑Operate‑Transfer
DAAKYI builds and runs the capability, then transfers it.
Best for · National and sector SOCs seeking ownership
Engagement model
Capability Development
Training, certification and mentoring programs.
Best for · Regulators and operators growing talent
Engagement model
Long‑Term Operations
Multi-year operations and continuous improvement.
Best for · Critical systems needing sustained assurance
Threat Scenarios
What It Looks Like in Practice
Ransomware at a Utility
How It Shows Up
Billing systems stall, and operators notice unusual remote sessions reaching the boundary of the control network.
Response
Isolate the IT-to-OT conduit, preserve evidence, and switch to rehearsed manual operating procedures while the regulator is notified.
Cascading Payment Outage
How It Shows Up
A processor failure causes merchant declines, then mobile money queues and call-center surges across several institutions.
Response
Sector coordination activates, shared indicators circulate, and continuity plans built on ISO 22301 principles set the recovery order.
Supplier Compromise in a Telecom Network
How It Shows Up
A vendor update or management interface shows administrative logins from unfamiliar locations.
Response
Threat hunting reviews vendor access, credentials are rotated, and supplier access is limited to monitored, time-bound sessions.
Government Data Leaving the Jurisdiction
How It Shows Up
A ministry discovers backups or analytics copies stored in an unapproved foreign region.
Response
Data is inventoried, classified, and relocated to in-jurisdiction hosting, with access policies and audit logging enforced afterward.
| Scenario | How It Shows Up | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Ransomware at a Utility | Billing systems stall, and operators notice unusual remote sessions reaching the boundary of the control network. | Isolate the IT-to-OT conduit, preserve evidence, and switch to rehearsed manual operating procedures while the regulator is notified. |
| Cascading Payment Outage | A processor failure causes merchant declines, then mobile money queues and call-center surges across several institutions. | Sector coordination activates, shared indicators circulate, and continuity plans built on ISO 22301 principles set the recovery order. |
| Supplier Compromise in a Telecom Network | A vendor update or management interface shows administrative logins from unfamiliar locations. | Threat hunting reviews vendor access, credentials are rotated, and supplier access is limited to monitored, time-bound sessions. |
| Government Data Leaving the Jurisdiction | A ministry discovers backups or analytics copies stored in an unapproved foreign region. | Data is inventoried, classified, and relocated to in-jurisdiction hosting, with access policies and audit logging enforced afterward. |
Outcomes
What Your Institution Gains
- Sovereign security operations capability
- Protected essential services
- Skilled regulators and operators
Methodology
The Method, Step by Step
- 1
Frame National Risk
Define the services in scope, the threats that matter, and the legal duties that apply. Use ISO 31000 principles to rank risk by national impact rather than by technology type. Agree who owns each decision, so strategy and funding follow evidence.
- 2
Identify Critical Assets
Map services to assets, dependencies, suppliers, and data locations. Propose candidates for critical information infrastructure designation and record the reasoning. Validate the map with operators, because they know which undocumented connections would actually break a service. Gaps in ownership are logged for follow-up.
- 3
Apply and Assure Controls
Select controls from recognized baselines such as NIST CSF, ISO/IEC 27001, and IEC 62443 for industrial systems. Assess each operator against them, test the findings technically, and record exceptions with owners and dates. Assurance repeats on a schedule, so controls are shown to hold over time.
- 4
Operate and Rehearse
Run monitoring, triage, and incident handling against agreed playbooks aligned with NIST SP 800-61. Exercise them with regulators, operators, and communications teams together. Each exercise ends with corrections to procedures, detection rules, and contact lists, so lessons change daily practice rather than filling a report.
- 5
Transfer and Sustain
Move ownership in stages. Local staff shadow, then lead, then run each process while documentation, access rights, and tooling administration pass to the institution. Transfer is accepted against measurable criteria, and continuous improvement continues after handover through reviews and refresher training.
How It Works
How National Cybersecurity & Critical Infrastructure Comes Together
- 01Strategy
- 02Protect
- 03Operate
- 04Transfer
Regulatory & Industry Context
The Obligations This Service Supports
Programs support national cybersecurity strategies, Ghana's Act 1038 and sector-regulator directives.
Frameworks DAAKYI helps clients implement
- Ghana Act 1038
- NIST CSF
- ISO/IEC 27001
Framework references describe client implementation support, not DAAKYI certifications.
Deliverables and Roles
What You Receive, and Who Does What
| Deliverable | Purpose |
|---|---|
| National or Sector Cybersecurity Strategy | Sets objectives, ownership, and priorities that regulators and operators can be measured against. |
| Critical Information Infrastructure Register | Records designated services, assets, and dependencies so protection effort follows national impact. |
| Control Assurance Report | Shows how each operator performs against the chosen baseline, with prioritized and owned remediation actions. |
| Incident Coordination Playbooks | Define who reports, who decides, and who communicates when an incident crosses organizational boundaries. |
| SOC Operating Model and Transfer Plan | Describes people, processes, and tooling, plus the acceptance criteria for handing over operations. |
| Role | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Regulator or National Authority | Designates critical information infrastructure, sets reporting duties, and verifies that operators comply. |
| Operator Security Lead | Owns controls, incident reporting, and recovery for the essential service the organization runs. |
| Sector CERT or SOC Analyst | Monitors, triages, and shares indicators across the institutions of one sector. |
| Engagement Lead (Provider Side) | Keeps strategy, assurance, and operations aligned and manages the staged transfer to local owners. |
Maturity Model
Where Organizations Typically Stand
Stage 1
Ad Hoc
Security depends on individuals. Critical assets are not formally identified, and incident reporting is informal.
Stage 2
Defined
Strategy, policies, and designation criteria exist. Operators know their duties, but verification is irregular.
Stage 3
Managed
Sector monitoring, tested playbooks, and recurring assurance are running. Metrics show whether controls and response perform as intended.
Stage 4
Sovereign and Adaptive
Local teams run and improve operations independently. Threat intelligence, exercises, and legal change feed back into design.
Frameworks and Regulation
The Standards That Shape This Work
NIST CSF 2.0
Its six functions, Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover, give regulators and operators a shared structure for national programs. Govern is especially useful for assigning accountability across institutions.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
Annex A holds 93 controls in four themes: organizational, people, physical, and technological. Operators can use it to build certifiable management systems, with ISO/IEC 27002 guiding implementation.
Ghana Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038)
It established the Cyber Security Authority and provides for designation and protection of Critical Information Infrastructure, licensing of providers and professionals, and incident reporting.
IEC 62443
It addresses security for industrial automation and control systems, which makes it directly relevant to energy and utility operators.
Buyer Guidance
Choosing the Right Provider
What to look for
- Look for a provider that begins with essential services and legal duties, not with a product list.
- Ask for evidence of OT competence, since industrial protocols and safety constraints differ from enterprise IT.
- Require a transfer plan with acceptance criteria written into the contract from the first phase.
- Confirm where logs, evidence, and case data will be hosted and who can access them.
Questions to ask a provider
- How will you decide which assets qualify as critical information infrastructure?
- Which deliverables prove local staff can run the SOC without your help?
- How do you respect safety constraints when testing industrial control environments?
- Where will our data be stored, and how is access audited?
Technical Detail
For Architects and Security Leads
Segmenting IT and OT at Critical Sites
Industrial sites need defined conduits between enterprise networks and control networks. IEC 62443 describes zones and conduits: grouping assets by shared risk, then controlling every path between groups. A typical design places a demilitarized zone between the two networks, allows only brokered protocols through, and requires multifactor authentication and session recording for remote access. Passive network monitoring then inventories devices and learns normal protocol behavior without disturbing controllers. Alerts for unexpected writes, firmware changes, or new engineering workstations are routed to the SOC. NIST SP 800-82 provides guidance on tailoring controls where availability and safety take priority over patching speed.
Detection Engineering for a Sector SOC
Sector detection starts with a use-case catalog mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, which organizes adversary behavior into 14 tactics. Analysts record which techniques each log source can reveal and where blind spots remain. Rules are written once, tested against simulated activity, and tuned per operator to reduce false positives. Shared indicators from the sector CERT are enriched and expired on a schedule so stale data does not flood queues. Coverage reports then show regulators which tactics are visible across the sector, turning detection quality into a measurable national indicator. Gaps become engineering tasks with owners and review dates.
Glossary
Key Terms
- Critical Information Infrastructure (CII)
- The systems whose compromise would seriously affect essential national services, security, or the economy.
- Sector CERT
- A computer emergency response team serving one sector, such as finance or energy, with alerts and coordination.
- Build–Operate–Transfer
- A delivery model in which a provider builds and runs a capability before handing ownership to the client.
- Data Sovereignty
- The principle that data stays subject to the laws and control of the jurisdiction where it originates.
Related
Explore Connected Capabilities
Proof Points
What We Can Stand Behind
- National SOC and digital forensics design, financial-sector CERT advisory and sector SOC engagements in West and Southern Africa.
- Every stage of DAAKYI's delivery methodology produces documented, auditable deliverables.
FAQ
Questions Leaders Ask
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