SECURE · OT and Industrial Security Engineering
Protect Industrial Operations Where Cyber Incidents Become Safety Incidents.
We design and implement security for ICS, SCADA and OT networks.
- Safe, available operations
- Visibility across the IT/OT boundary
- Reduced IT-to-OT pivoting risk
- 1Scope the Process
- 2Discover Assets Passively
- 3Model Zones and Risk
- 4Stage and Enforce Controls
- 5Monitor and Rehearse
Executive Summary
- 01OT security starts from process consequence, so controls protect safety and uptime before they protect data.
- 02Segmentation and tightly controlled remote access do the most to keep an IT intrusion away from controllers.
- 03Monitoring works only when it understands industrial protocols and is paired with rehearsed operational response.
The Challenge
Operational technology was built for availability, not security, and IT/OT convergence has connected it to threats it was never designed to face.
Intrusion and IT-to-OT pivoting can disrupt supply and endanger safety.
The DAAKYI Approach
DAAKYI assesses OT risk and architecture, then engineers segmentation, secure ICS and SCADA design and OT integration with operations teams.
Work is scoped to each operational environment.
- 01
OT risk and architecture assessment
- 02
OT security architecture
- 03
Industrial network segmentation
- 04
OT integration and implementation
In Depth
How the Discipline Works
Start with What the Plant Does
Effective OT security begins with an accurate picture of the process, not the network diagram. Engineers identify which assets run the physical process, which functions are safety-critical, and which failures would stop production or harm people. Asset inventories in industrial sites are often stale, so passive discovery and walkdowns with plant staff fill the gaps. Each asset is then tied to a consequence: loss of view, loss of control, or loss of safety function. That consequence ranking, rather than generic vulnerability scores, decides where controls go first and what level of change the site can tolerate.
Segmentation Limits How Far Intrusions Travel
Flat industrial networks let one compromised workstation reach controllers. Segmentation divides the environment into zones of equal trust and restricts traffic between them to defined conduits. Between corporate IT and control networks, a demilitarized zone hosts historians, patch servers and remote-access gateways so that no direct session crosses the boundary. Rules are written around specific industrial protocols and named device pairs, not broad address ranges. Because many controllers cannot be patched often, these boundaries act as compensating controls. Each rule is tested against live process traffic before enforcement, so a blocked flow never becomes a stopped line.
Monitoring Must Understand Industrial Behavior
Detection in OT differs from enterprise monitoring. Controllers talk in protocols such as Modbus, DNP3 and OPC, and normal behavior is highly repetitive. That makes deviations visible: a new engineering workstation, an unexpected write command, or a firmware change outside a maintenance window. Passive sensors on mirrored ports observe traffic without touching the process. Alerts then need context from operations staff, because a legitimate maintenance task and an attack can look alike. Findings feed incident handling aligned to NIST SP 800-61, with playbooks that decide when to isolate a segment and when to keep the process running safely.
A control network is secure when an intruder cannot move and operators can still run the plant by hand.
Capability Matrix
What the Service Includes
| Capability | Coverage | GUIDE | SECURE | OPERATE | Delivered Through |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| OT Security Architecture | Zones and conduits for industrial networks. | – | SECURE stage | – | Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements |
| Industrial Network Segmentation | IT/OT boundary controls. | – | SECURE stage | – | Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements |
| Secure ICS and SCADA Design | Security built into control systems. | – | SECURE stage | – | Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements |
| OT Integration | Controls implemented with operations teams. | – | SECURE stage | – | Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements |
OT Security Architecture
Zones and conduits for industrial networks.
- Stage
- SECURE
- Delivered Through
- Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements
Industrial Network Segmentation
IT/OT boundary controls.
- Stage
- SECURE
- Delivered Through
- Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements
Secure ICS and SCADA Design
Security built into control systems.
- Stage
- SECURE
- Delivered Through
- Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements
OT Integration
Controls implemented with operations teams.
- Stage
- SECURE
- Delivered Through
- Project Implementation, Advisory Engagements
How It Works
How OT and Industrial Security Engineering Works
- 01Assess
- 02Segment
- 03Secure
- 04Monitor
Methodology
The Method, Step by Step
- 1
Scope the Process
Define the plants, lines and control systems in scope with operations leaders. Record safety functions, outage windows and change-freeze periods. Agree which consequences matter most, such as loss of view, loss of control or loss of safety function. This scoping prevents testing or controls from touching anything the site has not approved.
- 2
Discover Assets Passively
Build the inventory from passive traffic capture, configuration exports and site walkdowns rather than active scanning, which can crash fragile controllers. Capture vendor, firmware, protocols, communication paths and remote-access routes. Reconcile findings with maintenance records so undocumented devices and forgotten vendor connections surface early.
- 3
Model Zones and Risk
Group assets into zones by function and consequence, then define the conduits that must exist between them. Assess each zone against target security levels from IEC 62443. Rank gaps by consequence and exploitability, and note where compensating controls are needed because patching is impractical.
- 4
Stage and Enforce Controls
Introduce controls in monitor-only mode first. Validate firewall rules, remote-access brokering and application allow-listing against real traffic. Schedule enforcement inside approved maintenance windows with tested rollback steps. Operators confirm that process behavior is unchanged in the field before each change is declared complete.
- 5
Monitor and Rehearse
Tune detections to the baseline of each zone and connect alerts to incident procedures. Run tabletop exercises that include operators, engineers and IT responders. Rehearse manual operation and recovery from known-good backups of controller logic, so the site can ride through an event without improvising.
Operating Model
Delivered from the SECURE Pillar
Pillar position
SECURE
Engineering, Architecture & Implementation
Engagement model
Project Implementation
Design and deployment of security technologies.
Best for · Modernization and transformation
Engagement model
Advisory Engagements
Fixed-scope assessments, strategy, compliance and testing.
Best for · Defined questions with a clear deliverable
Threat Scenarios
What It Looks Like in Practice
Compromised Vendor Remote Access
How It Shows Up
A vendor account logs in outside a work order, or a session reaches controllers it has never touched before.
Response
Brokered, time-limited access limits reach, and session recording shows what was done. Accounts tied to work orders are disabled when the work closes.
Ransomware Pivoting from Corporate IT
How It Shows Up
Corporate domain credentials appear on engineering workstations, or file shares on the historian begin encrypting.
Response
Industrial DMZ boundaries and separate OT identities stop the spread. Affected segments can be isolated while the process continues on local control.
Unauthorized Logic Change
How It Shows Up
A program download or firmware change appears on a controller outside a maintenance window.
Response
Protocol-aware detection flags the write, and verified backups of controller logic allow restoration to a known-good state.
Unmanaged Device in a Control Zone
How It Shows Up
A laptop, wireless bridge or cellular router appears on a network segment where it is not in the inventory.
Response
Passive discovery surfaces the device, and port security plus change control for the zone keep the inventory accurate.
| Scenario | How It Shows Up | Response |
|---|---|---|
| Compromised Vendor Remote Access | A vendor account logs in outside a work order, or a session reaches controllers it has never touched before. | Brokered, time-limited access limits reach, and session recording shows what was done. Accounts tied to work orders are disabled when the work closes. |
| Ransomware Pivoting from Corporate IT | Corporate domain credentials appear on engineering workstations, or file shares on the historian begin encrypting. | Industrial DMZ boundaries and separate OT identities stop the spread. Affected segments can be isolated while the process continues on local control. |
| Unauthorized Logic Change | A program download or firmware change appears on a controller outside a maintenance window. | Protocol-aware detection flags the write, and verified backups of controller logic allow restoration to a known-good state. |
| Unmanaged Device in a Control Zone | A laptop, wireless bridge or cellular router appears on a network segment where it is not in the inventory. | Passive discovery surfaces the device, and port security plus change control for the zone keep the inventory accurate. |
Outcomes
What Your Institution Gains
- Safe, available operations
- Visibility across the IT/OT boundary
- Reduced IT-to-OT pivoting risk
Deliverables and Roles
What You Receive, and Who Does What
| Deliverable | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Asset and Communication Inventory | Gives a trusted list of devices, firmware and data flows on which every later decision is based. |
| Zone and Conduit Design | Defines which assets share trust and which flows between them are permitted. |
| Consequence‑Ranked Risk Register | Orders gaps by their effect on safety and production rather than by score alone. |
| Remote Access Standard | Sets how employees and vendors reach control systems and under what conditions. |
| OT Incident Response Playbooks | Documents who decides to isolate, when to switch to manual operation, and how to recover. |
| Role | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Plant Operations Manager (Client) | Approves change windows and decides what is safe to alter on a running process. |
| Control Systems Engineer (Client) | Holds knowledge of controller logic and confirms each control leaves process behavior unchanged. |
| OT Security Architect (Provider) | Designs zones, conduits and boundary controls that fit the process and its constraints. |
| CISO or Enterprise Risk Owner (Client) | Owns risk decisions that span IT and OT and reports on them to executive leadership. |
Maturity Model
Where Organizations Typically Stand
Stage 1
Ad Hoc
Networks are flat, inventories are incomplete, and vendors connect by whatever route is convenient.
Stage 2
Defined
Zones and an industrial DMZ exist, remote access is controlled, and a named owner maintains the inventory.
Stage 3
Monitored
Passive sensors baseline industrial traffic, and alerts reach responders who understand the process.
Stage 4
Resilient
Incident playbooks are rehearsed with operators, recovery from known-good logic is tested, and improvement is measured against a target.
Frameworks and Regulation
The Standards That Shape This Work
IEC 62443
It addresses security for industrial automation and control systems, including the zone and conduit model and target security levels that guide segmentation design.
NIST SP 800-82
It gives guidance for securing OT, covering architecture, risk and control selection that account for performance and safety needs.
NIST CSF 2.0
Its six functions (Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover) give executives a shared structure for reporting OT risk.
Ghana Cybersecurity Act, 2020 (Act 1038)
It provides for the designation and protection of Critical Information Infrastructure and for incident reporting, both relevant to operators whose control systems may be designated.
Buyer Guidance
Choosing the Right Provider
What to look for
- Look for engineers who have worked inside live plants and can explain safety and availability tradeoffs.
- Expect passive discovery as the default, with any active testing agreed in writing and run in approved windows.
- Require designs that map to IEC 62443 zones and conduits and to your own regulatory duties.
- Insist on deliverables your operations team can maintain after the engagement ends.
Questions to ask a provider
- How do you discover assets without disrupting fragile controllers?
- Which changes would you make first, and how do you test them before enforcement?
- How do you handle vendor remote access that our suppliers insist on?
- What does your design assume when patching is not possible?
Regulatory & Industry Context
The Obligations This Service Supports
Programs reference NIST CSF and critical-infrastructure obligations under Ghana's Act 1038.
Frameworks DAAKYI helps clients implement
- NIST CSF
- Ghana Act 1038
- ISO/IEC 27001
Framework references describe client implementation support, not DAAKYI certifications.
Technical Detail
For Architects and Security Leads
Framework and regulatory alignment
- NIST CSF
- Ghana Act 1038
- ISO/IEC 27001
Programs reference NIST CSF and critical-infrastructure obligations under Ghana's Act 1038.
Architecture reference
How OT and Industrial Security Engineering Works: Assess → Segment → Secure → Monitor.
DAAKYI assesses OT risk and architecture, then engineers segmentation, secure ICS and SCADA design and OT integration with operations teams.
Remote Access Through a Brokered Jump Architecture
Vendor and engineer remote access is a common route into control networks. A hardened design terminates sessions in the industrial DMZ on a jump host or brokered access gateway. Users authenticate with multifactor credentials, and access is granted per asset and per time window rather than as a standing VPN tunnel. Sessions are recorded, and file transfer passes through a scanning step. Direct inbound connections from the internet to controllers or HMIs are removed. Vendor accounts are individual, not shared, and disabled when the work order closes. This keeps a single stolen credential from becoming free movement across zones.
Passive Monitoring and Protocol Awareness
Network taps or SPAN ports feed sensors that decode industrial protocols and build a baseline of who talks to whom, using which function codes. Deep packet inspection can distinguish a read request from a write or a program download. Detections map to adversary behavior in MITRE ATT&CK, which includes a matrix for industrial control systems alongside the Enterprise matrix. Sensors sit out of band, so a sensor fault cannot interrupt control traffic. Sensor placement favors conduits between zones and the DMZ, where one sensor sees many flows. Logs forward to a central platform so IT and OT events can be correlated in one timeline.
Glossary
Key Terms
- Conduit
- A defined, controlled communication path between two zones, with rules on what may cross it.
- Industrial DMZ
- A buffer network between corporate IT and control networks that hosts shared services so no direct sessions cross.
- Safety Instrumented System
- An independent control layer that brings a process to a safe state when conditions become dangerous.
- Historian
- A database that records process data over time and often bridges the control and business networks.
Related
Explore Connected Capabilities
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Platforms
Proof Points
What We Can Stand Behind
- Every stage of DAAKYI's delivery methodology produces documented, auditable deliverables.
FAQ
Questions Leaders Ask
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